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Faculty and Deans

CHOICE OF SMALL BUSINESS
TAX ENTITY:
FACTS AND FICTIONS
by John W. Lee

John William Lee III is a professor of law at Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William &
Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia.
This article summarizes parts of Lee’s forthcoming article “A Populist Political Perspective of the
Business Tax Entities Universe: Hey the Stars Might
Lie But the Numbers Never Do,” 78 Texas L. Rev. 885
(2000). Conventional wisdom, says Lee, holds that
the LLC, due to its limited liability and hassle-free
single level of taxation, will supplant C and S corporations as the choice of entity for new businesses.
In fact, in most jurisdictions corporate formations
outnumber LLC formations 2:1 or more, and IRS
Statistics of Income (SOI) projects that the S corporation will be the fastest growing tax entity for
2000 to 2005. Lee believes that an underlying
reason is that double taxation of private C corporations is a myth. Thirty-seven percent of C corporations (more than 750,000 in 1993) accounting
for about 5 percent of C corporation income are
small-income corporations, annually reporting on
the average just $40,000, taxable at 15 percent. In
sharp contrast, 80 percent of the owners of these
small-income, mostly private C corporations are
taxable at 31 percent or higher; 45 percent, at 39.6
percent befo re exempti on and deduction
phaseouts and wage taxes. And there is little or no
second tax. Dividends are rarely paid by private C
corporations. Moreover, about half of this private C
stock is held until death and any sales are usually long
deferred and taxed at capital gains rates (20 percent or
less). Thus, inside sheltering results in a $3 billion/year tax expenditure according to the Joint Committee on Taxation, violating ability-to-pay principles
just as Congress intended.

Similarly, 33,500 mostly private, moderate-income C corporations accounting for 11 percent of C
corporation income, annually report average income
of $2 million taxed at 34 percent while their owners
are taxable at the highest rates, as high as 45 percent
after phaseouts and Medicare taxes if this income
were passed through to them. This probably results
in at least as great a tax subsidy to the moderate-income as to the small-income C corporations. Also,
in 1993 61 percent of C corporations reported no
income or incurred a loss. Many of these “dry” C
corporations were used to deduct health insurance
costs for owner-employees. As such costs gradually
become fully deductible by the self-employed and 2
percent or more S corporation shareholders, such
use ought to decline and, in fact, SOI projects slight
declines from 2000 to 2005 in the number of smallest
C corporation returns and slight increases in the
number of larger C corporation returns.
The story as to S corporations’ flourishing is more
complicated. Lee writes that the reasons vary from
the practical (over 50 percent have only one shareholder, so the capital- and income-shifting advantages of LLCs are moot), to the mundane (taxpayers and advisers are more familiar with S
corporations than LLCs), and to the arcane (perceived wage tax advantages to S corporations
paying dividends rather than salaries to shareholder-employees). Finally, more than half of the
undisputed growth in LLCs (including LLPs) is
revealed by SOI to be in the real estate and professional services market segments, which are the
dominant market segments for partnerships. In fact,
much of the LLC growth is at the expense of general
and limited partnerships.
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The limited liability company literature by and large
myopically focuses on the “burden” of double taxation,
not perceiving the considerable political support for
the tax “boon” of graduated inside rates to small-income private C corporations and the resultant violation
of vertical and horizontal equity. The common view
resulting from that fundamental conceptual astigmatism has been that entrepreneurs seeking to avoid
private C corportaion double taxation while obtaining
limitation of liability will rush to the new LLC
passthrough entity. The LLC literature also assumes
that due to the various ownership, capital structure,
and allocation of income and loss restrictions applicable to S corporations, but not partnerships or
LLCs, and the unavailability of inside basis adjustments on transfer of an ownership interest in the entity
as well as other discontinuities in passthrough taxation, LLCs will supplant S corporations as well. Factually, however, new firms continued to be formed in
most jurisdictions in corporation-to-LLC ratios of 2:1
to 3:1. What is wrong with this picture?

I. Facts on the Ground
The 1997-99 Annual Update Reports of the Jurisdictions of the International Association of Corporation
Administrators (IACA) for 1995-1998, show that while
the number of new reportings by LLCs has increased
greatly in most jurisdictions, the number of new reportings by corporations for 1997 stayed constant or increased slightly in most jurisdictions and declined,
usually by less than 100, in 30 percent of the jurisdictions. For 1998, 10 percent of the jurisdictions, including California and Texas, continued to show a slight
increase in the number of new corporate filings, but
most jurisdictions reported small percentage declines.
Nevertheless, for 1995 to 1998 in all jurisdictions except
Connecticut (which phenomenon may be explained
below), the number of new corporations (undifferentiated between C and S corporations) reporting has
exceeded the number of new LLCs reporting for each
year.1 For 1997, the ratio of new corporation to new
LLC reports in two jurisdictions was as high as 20 to 1
and 50 to 1; in two more jurisdictions the ratio of corporate to LLC formations was 8 to 1; in 20 percent of
the jurisdictions 5 to 1; in 30 percent 3 to 1; in 20 percent
2 to 1; and in three jurisdictions, the ratio of LLC to
corporate formations was approaching 1 to 1.
For 1998, the percentage of the jurisdictions in the
4:1 or greater range, which included Texas and New
York, declined to 10 percent of the jurisdictions; the
percentage of 3:1 range jurisdictions declined to 20
percent; and over 15 percent ranged from 2:1 to 2.5:1,
including California and New Jersey. In the rest, save
Connecticut, corporate formations still exceeded LLC
formations. For 1998, in most jurisdictions with large
numbers (more than 30,000) of new corporate filings,
the corporate-to-LLC new filings ratio was greater than
4:1 (Florida, Illinois, New York, and Texas), or between

1
In Connecticut there was roughly a 3:2 ratio of LLC to
corporate formations for 1997; more than 2:1 for 1998.
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2:1 and 3:1 (California, New Jersey, and Georgia). The
exception to this pattern is Michigan with a 1.5:1 ratio.
In some instances the varying ratios may reflect
different legal cultures, different choices among different market segments, or different state tax treatment.
The latter especially appears to be the case where LLCs
are subject to franchise taxes but (limited) partnerships
are not, as in Texas and California,2 and until recently
in Florida and Pennsylvania, resulting in a 50:1 and a
5:1 corporation-to-LLC filing ratio in Florida and
Texas, respectively, for 1997.3 Florida’s adverse LLC
franchise tax rule was repealed for half of 1998 and the
ratio of new corporate to new LLC filings dropped to
27:1 for the whole year, while Pennsylvania, with the

2
See Cal. Rev. & Tax Code section 23151(a) (West 1998)
(imposing a franchise tax on corporations doing business in
the state); Tex. Tax Code Ann. section 171.001(a) (1992) (imposing franchise taxes on corporations and LLCs doing business in Texas).
3
For instance, California’s LLC regime originally contained two biases against full use that reportedly caused the
statute to be a “dud” at first: (1) professionals and anyone
licensed by the state (67 categories) could not form an LLC
(due to pressure from the California Trial Lawyers Association). Jane Applegate, “Thanks to Exclusions, Liability Shield
Plan Languishes,” Sacramento Bee, Dec. 26, 1994, F-2; Jan Norman, “No Stampede — Yet — for Limited Liability,” Sacramento Bee, May 29, 1995, B-1; and (2) in addition to an annual fee
based on gross receipts, LLCs had to pay the minimum $800
corporate franchise tax. Norman, supra. Subsequently, special
taxes on limited partnerships and limited liability companies
were repealed but the franchise tax is still imposed on LLCs.
See Cal. Revenue & Tax’n Code Ann. sections 23081, 2309123096.5, 23097-23099.5, 23038(c) (1992) (1999 Supp.). Not
surprisingly, in 1995, the ratio of California corporate filings
to LLC filings was 6:1, dropped to 4:1 for 1996 and 3:1 for
1997 and 2.5:1 for 1998. Id. California now permits “professionals,” but not other licensed services businesses, to organize limited liability partnerships. Cal. Corp. Code section
16951 (1992 & 1999 Supp.) (recognizing only registered
limited liability partnerships and foreign limited liability
partnerships). Texas and Florida applied a corporate franchise tax to LLCs (in Florida’s case in effect a 5.5 percent
corporate income tax) but have no income tax that would
apply to partnerships. Tex. Tax Code Ann. section 171.001(a)(b) (West 1992); Fla. Stat. Ann. sections 608.471, 220.02 (West
1989 and 1993, respectively). Florida repealed its franchise
tax as to LLCs effective July 1, 1998. Fla. Stat. Ann. section
608.47 (1999 Supp.). Before the amendment, Florida’s corporate filings compared to LLC filings were 50:1 for 1997
(115,835 to 2,357). Id. Comparison of 1997 filings to 1999
filings will be very interesting. For 1998, the Florida ratio fell
to 27:1 (114,796 to 5,124). Id. Similarly, Pennsylvania originally taxed LLCs generally like corporations except for LLCs set
up by professionals, which were taxed like limited partnerships. 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. sections 8925, 8997 (1995) (treating
LLCs like corporations for tax purposes and taxing professional LLCs as limited partnerships), repealed insofar as it conflicted with Act of May 7, 1997, P.L. 85, No. 7, Sec. 35.1(b).
Section 8925 was repealed effective January 1, 1998. Act of
May 7, 1997, P.L. 85, No. 7, section 35.1(b) (amending the Act
of March 4, 1971 (P.L. 6, No. 2)). For 1998, new corporate
filings in Pennsylvania dropped, new LLC filings increased
by roughly the same number, and the ratio of new corporate
to LLC filings dropped from 20:1 to 7:1.
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repeal of its adverse LLC franchise tax rule for the
whole year, dropped from a 20:1 ratio to 7:1. In Texas
the adverse LLC franchise tax remained in place and
the 5:1 ratio remained the same as well. Conversely, in
Connecticut, where LLC to corporation formations
were running 3:2 in 1997 and a little over 2:1 in 1998,
the state taxation rules greatly favor members of LLCs
over shareholders in S corportaions, since Connecticut
imposes no individual income taxation (except on certain passive income of partnerships) while subjecting
S corporations, but not LLCs, to a franchise tax based
on income.4 Thus the extremes at both ends of the ratio
of corporate to LLC formation spectrum for 1997 — 3:2
for Connecticut, 20:1 for Pennsylvania, and 50:1 for
Florida — appear to reflect peculiar state taxation of
these business tax entities.
I suspect that in many of the other jurisdictions the
varying ratios of filings may reflect the relative importance of the various market segments in the jurisdiction
and perhaps the varying degrees of inertia among the
small business practitioners and possibly clients as
well. It may be that high corporation-to-LLC formation
ratios correlate with importance of manufacturing,
which is more likely to be conducted in corporate form,
as in New York (5:1), New Jersey (3.6:1), and Ohio (3:1)
(1997). Delaware’s corporation-to-LLC ratios of 2.5:1
for 1997 and 1.6:1 for 1998 are less important than the
high numbers of formations in both categories, probably
reflecting the fact that it is the jurisdiction of choice as
to both corporations and LLCs for many out-of-state
businesses.

II. The Myth of Double Taxation
A. Use of Inside Corp. Rates: Ultimate Tax Shelter
Double taxation of private C corporations is mostly
a myth. As of 1993, 61 percent of C corporations
reported zero income or losses5 and 37 percent, or
around 750,000, small-income (mostly private) C corporations reporting less than the phaseout of the
graduated corporate tax exemption amount ($335,000)
accounted for 5.3 percent of C corporation income,6

4
Conn. Gen. Stat. 12-214 and 217(c) (1) (1998 Supp.) (providing that an S corporation also must bring back compensation
paid to principals into pro rata share subject to income-based
franchise tax); William Hathaway, “Profit Protection: Limited
Liability Entities Emerge as Popular Tax and Liability Shield,”
Hartford Courant, Apr. 28, 1997, 8; John T. Del Negro, “Connecticut Taxation of Business Entities,” 64 Conn. Bar J. (Special
Issue) SI-113, SI-115 (1990) (providing an overview of the business taxation system in Connecticut and explaining that S
corporations are subject to the corporate franchise tax while
partnerships and other passthrough entities are not).
5
See Joint Committee on Taxation Staff, Impact on Small
Business of Replacing the Federal Income Tax 7 n.8 (JCS-3-96
April 23, 1996), Doc 96-12163 (132 pages), 96 TNT 81-16 (“JCT,
Small Business”).
6
Id. 1993 Corporation Source Book of Statistics of Income 1, 481
(Pub. 1053 revised March 1993), reveals that for 1993 there
were 3,964,629 active corporations including 1,901,505 S corporations. There thus were 2,063,124 active C corporations.
2,063,124 x 0.37 = 763,356.
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with average income of less than $40,000,7 thus subject
on the average to a 15 percent rate. Additionally, I
reckon that as of 1993 around 33,500 moderate-income8
(from $335,000 to less than $10 million) C corporations
reported around 11.8 percent of C corporation income
with an average income of about $2 million9 a year
taxed at the flat 34 percent inside corporate rate. The
owners of these mostly private10 moderate-income C
7
IRC section 11(b) (1) (A). 1993 Statistics of Corporate Income,
supra note 6, at 245 (lines 66 less 69), reveals that for 1993, C
corporations having net income reported $571,922,088,000
($658,666,005,000 (all corporate income)-$86,743,917,000 (S
corporation income)). Recall that the 61 percent of C corporations reporting no income or a deficit were already accounted
for, so net income C corporations is the relevant universe.
Since 5.3 percent of the income for all active C corporations
reporting net income is $30,311,870,000 (5.3 percent x
$571,922,088,000), the average net income of these 763,356 C
corporations is $39,708 per corporation ($30,311,870,000 ÷
763,356 = $39,708).
8
The entire group of profitable C corporations with taxable
income above $335,000 is 2 percent of all C corporations according to the JCT, Small Business, supra note 5. That number
is 41,264 (2,063,124 x 2 percent). The approximately 4,000
profitable corporations with assets (adjusted basis) from $100
million to $250 million paid 6.2 percent of all corporate income taxes; the approximately 2,000 profitable corporations
with assets from $250 million to $500 million, 5.3 percent; and
the approximately 2,000 profitable corporations with more
than $500 million, 71.2 percent. Joint Committee on Taxation
Staff, Selected Materials Relating to the Federal Tax System Under
Present Law and Various Alternative Tax Systems 60 table C-22
(March 14, 1996), Doc 96-7976 (96 pages), 96 TNT 53-8 (“JCT,
Federal Tax System”).
Subtracting from 41,264 the 7,774 profitable large-asset
(and income) C corporations [(8,000 large asset corporations,
JCT, Federal Tax System, supra; less 226 large-asset profitable
S corporations, 1993 Statistics of Corporate Income, supra note
6 at 497 line 1] leaves 33,490 moderate-asset profitable C
corporations (the loss C corporations — large, moderate, and
small asset — are included in the 61 percent no income or
loss corporations).
9
For 1993 C corporations with assets of $100 million and
above reported income of $474,691,930,000. See 1993 Statistics
of Corporate Income, supra note 6, at 245 (line 66 less line 69).
All C corporation income amounted to $571,922,088,000, see
supra note 7. Therefore such large-asset C corporations
reported 82.9 percent of C corporation income for 1993
($474,691,930,000 ÷ $571,922,088,000 = 82.9 percent); see also
JCT, Federal Tax System, supra note 8 at 60, Table C-22 (8,000
largest-asset corporations paid 83.7 percent of corporate taxes
in 1993. Small-income C corporations reported 5.3 percent of
C corporation income. See JCT, Small Business, supra note 6,
at 5 n.8. Therefore, moderate income/asset C corporations
reported 11.8 percent of C corporation income. (100 percent 82.9 percent - 5.3 percent = 11.8 percent) All C Corporate
income amounted to $571,922,088,000; 11.8 x $571,922,088,000
= $67,486,806,384. $67,486,806,384 ÷ 33,490 = $2,015,133.
10
See Susan Pace Hamill, “The Limited Liability Company:
A Catalyst Exposing the Corporate Integration Question,” 95
Mich. L. Rev. 393, 422 n.145 (1996) (calculating that approximately 10 percent of medium asset corporations are
publicly traded, thereby implying that the other 90 percent
are privately held). While our definitions of “moderate”
might not exactly correspond because she is using asset size
and I am estimating from income shares, I expect the results
would not vary very much.
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corporations would be taxed at the top individual rates
if this corporate income were taxed directly to them.
The top 10 percent of households by wealth own 80
percent of small firms and the top 2 percent own 45
percent of small firms.11 Treasury’s distribution tables
show that as of 1995 the top 1 percent of families consist
of 700,000 families, beginning at $349,438 of income
(subject to the 39.6 percent rate before phaseouts and
wage taxes); the top 5 percent consists of 2,300,000
families, beginning at $145,412 of income (subject at
least to the 36 percent rate); and the top 10 percent
consists of 3,500,000 families, beginning at $108,704 of
income (subject at least to the 31 percent rate).12 Thus
the owners of small income private C corporations
mostly would be taxed from 31 percent to 39.6 percent
(or even 45 percent taking account of phaseouts and
wage taxes 13 ) on any marginal income such as profits
they have split with their small-income C corporations
if they instead reported it directly.

B. Avoidance of Shareholder-Level Outside Tax
The dread second, outside tax on the inside income
of these small- and moderate-income private C corporations is largely avoided by holding the stock (or
merging with a public firm and holding that stock)
until death,14 usually without paying formal dividends; or selling it as a long-deferred capital gain taxed
at 18 to 20 percent.15 This gives rise to at least a $3
billion a year or more tax subsidy for the small-income

11
Jane G. Gravelle, Senior Specialist in Economic Policy,
Office of Senior Specialists, Congressional Research Service,
Small Business Tax Subsidy Proposals, 93 TNT 61-12.
12
John W. Lee, “Critique of Current Congressional Capital
Gains Contentions,” 15 Va. Tax Rev. 1, 41-2 (1995) (Lee, “Capital Gains Contentions”).
13
Taking account of the various phaseout results in effect
in a top marginal rate of 41.5 percent or so, depending on the
taxpayer’s dependency exemptions and personal deductions.
Craig J. Langstraat and K. Dianne Jackson, “Choice of Business Tax Entity After the 1993 Tax Act,” 11 Akron Tax J. 1,
26-27 (1995). The uncapped portion of the FICA taxes can add
another 2.9 percent as to nonpassive income. See Burgess J.W.
Raby and William L. Raby, “New Incentive for Avoiding SE
and FICA Tax,” Tax Notes, Dec. 14, 1998, p. 1389.
14
Lee, “Capital Gains Contentions,” supra note 12 at 15.
The revenue loss from such step up was estimated (before
the most recent stock market run up) to increase from $14
billion to $20 billion a year during 1995-99. Congressional
Research Service, Tax Expenditures: Compendium of Background
Material on Individual Provisions, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess 243
(Senate Budget Committee S. Prnt 103-101 Dec. 1994)
(prepared using Joint Committee on Taxation data) (“Tax Expenditures Compendium”).
15
David S. Hulse and Thomas R. Pope, “The Effect of Income Taxes on the Preference of Organizational Forms for
Small Businesses in the United States,” J. Small Business
Management, Jan. 1996, at 24-25.
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C corporations 16 and probably an equal subsidy for the
moderate-income C corporations.17 In short, the true
tax policy issue for private C corporations is not double
taxation, but w hether th e Treasury will get the
equivalent of one tax one time.18 It has not been able
to do so for the last 80 years. The transactional costs of
this inside shelter may, however, be high with many of
the complexities of corporate taxation generated by
its use (e.g., accumulated earnings and personal
holding company taxation), or by attempts to with-

16
The Joint Committee Staff calculates the tax expenditure
attributable to the inside shelter of the inside graduated small
income corporate rates as $3 billion a year; and the 1 point
spread from 34 percent to 35 percent as a $1 billion a year tax
expenditure. Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimates of Federal
Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 1999-2003 (JCS-7-98 December
15, 1998), Doc 98-36871 (33 pages), 98 TNT 240-4, para. 5. The
Joint Committee measures the tax expenditure attributable to
the inside graduated corporate rates by comparing them with
the top inside corporate rate of 35 percent (prior to 1993, 34
percent). The true comparison should be between the inside
graduated corporate rates and the outside individual income
rates that would apply if the small private C corporation income were taxed directly to the (active) owners. The amount
of the tax expenditure or subsidy would be at least as large as
the Joint Committee estimates. I estimate that the average
outside marginal rate (ideally less average present value of
any double tax realizations) for most shareholders of private
C corporations would be at least 36 percent or 39.6 percent if
the additional income now sheltered in their C corporations
were imputed to them. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
Comparison of the $3 billion Joint Committee estimate
with the $30 billion in taxable income attributable to smallincome C corporations, note 7 supra, indicates that the tax
expenditure is 10 percent of such income. The facts that the
spread between the inside graduated rates and the top inside
corporate income tax rate of 35 percent (the basis for the Joint
Committee’s calculations) is 20 percentage points on the first
$50,000 and 10 percentage points on the next $25,000 suggests
that a substantial number of the more than 750,000 smallincome C corporations report income from $75,000 to
$100,000 range where the preference is only 1 percentage
point as calculated by the Joint Committee Staff or from
$100,000 to $335,000 where there is no preference so calculated. The remaining profitable small-income C corporations
perforce have lower incomes on the average than the almost
$40,000 average for the group. Nevertheless, I expect that
there is still sufficient inside shelter overall for a large number
of private C corporations to drive the choice of tax entity
where earnings in excess of compensation to principals can
or need be left in the business.
17
The spread between the inside and outside rates here is
from 34 to 39.6 percent or 45 percent counting phaseouts and
wage taxes. See note 13 supra. The income reported by such
moderate income C corporations was $67,486,806,384 in 1993.
Therefore the preference was between $3.8 billion (5.6 percent
x $67,486,806,384 = $3,779,262,157) and $7.4 billion (11 percent
x $67,486,806,384 = $7,423,548,702).
18
John W. Lee, “Entity Classification and Integration:
Publicly Traded Partnerships, Personal Service Corporations,
and the Tax Legislative Process,” 8 Va. Tax Rev. 57, 68-69 (1988)
(Lee, “Entity Classification”).
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draw the accumulations at preferential rates (e.g.,
redemptions, liquidation-reincorporations, small corporation spin-offs, unreasonable compensation, and
constructive dividends).19

C. Inside Tax Shelter as Violating Tax Equity
When small- and moderate-income firms with active
high-income owners choose private C corporations,
they violate both horizontal and vertical tax equity —
a very bad policy result. In 1978, when public20 and
private C corporations rejected President Jimmy
Carter ’s well-intentioned calls for corporate-shareholder integration, Secretary of the Treasury Mike
Blumenthal passionately described to a Senate Finance
Committee private C corporations as
a device already advertised widely as the ‘ultimate tax shelter’[. Thus a] graduated corporate
rate structure raises troubling questions of tax
equity. . . . [I]ndividual owners of closely-held
corporations . . . are generally in higher income
tax brackets than the owners of publicly-held
companies. . . . To many owners of closely held
corporations, the corporate tax income tax — far
from being an additional burden — is actually a
relief from taxes which they would otherwise pay
if all of the income of their corporation were attributed directly to them.21

19

Hearings on Master Limited Partnerships before the House
Ways and Means Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 341, 348 (1987) (Statement of Professor Lee)
(“MLP Hearings”). The leading tax audit issue of private C
corporations is and has long been unreasonable compensation.
General Accounting Office, Tax Administration, Recurring Issues
in Tax D is put es Over Bus iness Expense De duct ions 10
(GAO/GDD-95-232 Sept. 1, 1995), Doc 95-8966 (26 pages), 95
TNT 189-39 (Section 263 capitalization is leading issue for
public C corporations; section 162 reasonable compensation,
for private C corporations; and section 274 substantiation, for
proprietorships); Joint Committee on Taxation Staff, Issues in
Simplification of the Income Tax Laws, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 32-3
(1977) (“compensation” is one of the eight most significant
issues at the IRS appellate level).
20
Hearings on the President’s 1978 Tax Reduction and Reform
Proposals Before the House Ways & Means Comm., 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. (Part 1) 94, 95, 102, 468-88 (1978) (statement of W.
Michael Blumenthal, Treasury Secretary); id. (Part 9) at 614451 (statement of Professor Michael J. Graetz).
21
Id. 94-5 (statement of Blumenthal); see Tax Expenditures
Compendium, supra note 14 at 255 (corporate rate graduation
can be used as a tax shelter, benefiting high-income owners
of small corporations); Staff of Senate Finance Comm.,
Preliminary Report on the Reform and Simplification of the Income
Taxation of Corporations, 98th Cong. 88 (Comm. Print 1983)
(“present law often leaves taxpayers better off, on balance,
than they would be if no corporate level tax were imposed”);
Gravelle, supra note 11 (given the passthrough S corporation
(and LLC) alternative, the main reason for choosing the
private C corporation is “tax avoidance”).
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Why else do you think that well-tax advised private C
corporations were then and still are formed?22 Why else
did Congress fashion the tax law this way? 23 Commissioner Guy Helvering had similarly explained to
Senate Finance Committee members 40 years earlier
the use of private C corporations to shelter income.
High-income shareholders could “reduce their taxes by
taking part of their income in the form of so-called
capital gains” after their corporations had retained income for a number of years taxed inside at low rates
enhancing the value of the stock.24 The commissioner
viewed this as a violation of ability to pay, i.e., vertical
equity. “It is inequitable and it is a source of great loss
to the public revenues to permit the corporate form to
be used by wealthy persons to avoid graduated individual income surtaxes.” 25 Furthermore, rather than
selling the appreciated stock, the taxpayer could hold
it until death so that a stepped-up (to then fair market
value) basis under the predecessor to section 1014
avoided the second level of taxation altogether. “Thus,

22
John W. Lee, “Capital Gains Exception to the House’s
General Utilities Repeal: Further Indigestions From Overly
Processed Corn Products,” Tax Notes, Mar. 31, 1986, pp. 1375,
1384 at n.39 (Lee, “General Utilities Repeal”); Hearings on H.R.
12395 (Revenue Act, 1936) before the Senate Finance Committee,
74th Cong., 2d Sess. 160 (1936) (statement of Senator Hugo
Black, D-Ala.); Internal-Revenue Hearings before the Senate
Finance Committee on the Proposed Revenue Act of 1921, 67th
Cong., 1st Sess. 453 (1921) (statement of Robert M. Miller,
formerly Solicitor of Internal Revenue) (with outside individual rates proposed to remain as high as 40 percent, “it is
clear that some balancing tax must be put on corporations, so
as to avoid forcing all businesses to incorporate. Otherwise
the great advantage of the corporate form would compel a
general shift in business forms.”). The outside individual rate
initially was reduced from 72 percent to only 50 percent, no
balancing tax was imposed, and such a general shift did occur.
“[I]n the year 1926 the number of copartnerships and corporations was about equal. The copartnerships have gradually
gone down each year and the corporations have gone up, until
in this year, the past year [1935], it has resulted in 205,000
copartnerships as against 500,000 and some corporations.” See
1936 Senate Hearings, supra at 20 (statement of Commissioner
Guy T. Helvering); Hearings on Revenue Act, 1936 before the
House Ways and Means Comm., 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 584 (1936)
(statement of Acting Chief Counsel Arthur H. Kent).
23
Cf. Jennifer Arlen and Deborah M. Weiss, “A Political
Theory of Corporate Taxation,” 105 Yale L. J. 325, 327 (1995)
(federal corporate tax structure is in response to what
managers want). Professors Arlen and Weiss also fall into the
double taxation of private C corporations briar patch. Id. at
346-47.
24
1936 Senate Hearings, supra note 22, at 22-23 (“What this
means in simple terms is the privilege of reinvesting earnings
without the payment of surtaxes on them, a privilege of very
great monetary value. . . .”). Individual capital gains were
then taxed under a sliding scale dependent on the holding
period much lower than ordinary income tax rates with a
maximum rate of 20.1 percent at the highest ordinary income
tax bracket after a 10-year holding period. John Lee, “President Clinton’s Capital Gains Proposals,” Tax Notes, June 7,
1993, p. 1399 at 1403 (Lee, “Capital Gains Proposals”); Lee,
“Capital Gains Contentions,” supra note 12, at 34 n. 123.
25
1936 Senate Hearings, supra note 22, at 24 (statement of
Commissioner Helvering).

421

COMMENTARY / SPECIAL REPORT

no special compensation is received by the Federal
Government for the loss in revenues suffered during
the lifetime of the owner by reason of his use of the
corporate form.” 26 General Counsel Herman Oliphant
stated well the underlying tax policy: “business profits,
by whomever derived and from whatever form of business derived, should all bear the same tax burden, just
because it is right. . . . ”27 That is horizontal equity.

Of course, Treasury was correct as a
matter of tax policy in the 1930s,
1970s, and 1980s.
Criticism of the inside graduated rates/smallincome corporate tax shelter as violating vertical
equity resurfaced again in the 1984 Treasury I Tax
Reform Proposals:
the current progressive rate structure for corporate income serves no affirmative purpose and
encourages the use of corporations to gain the
advantage of low marginal tax rates. The progressive rate structure for individuals is premised on
the ability-to-pay concept, which in turn reflects
an assumption that additional amounts of income
are increasingly available for discretionary, nonessential consumption. These concepts have no
relevance to corporate income, all of which is
either distributed or used to produce additional
income. Moreover, under current law a small corporation can escape high marginal tax rates on
corporate income by electing pass-through treatment as an S corporation.
. . . The current low rates of tax for certain
amounts of corporate income permit the use of
corporations as tax shelters for individuals. . . .
Where the corporate rate is significantly below
the individual’s marginal rate, the deferral advantage can more than offset the extra burden of
the corporate tax.28
Of course, Treasury was correct as a matter of tax
policy in the 1930s, 1970s, and 1980s. Use of a private
C corporation as an inside tax shelter is inconsistent
with vertical equity or ability to pay.29 Once populists

26

1936 House Hearings, supra note 22, at 20 (statement of Guy
T. Helvering, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Treasury
Department); [Confidential] Hearings on H.R. 8245 (Internal
Revenue) before the Senate Finance Committee, 67th Cong. 1st
Sess. 307 (Confidential Comm. Prnt 1921) (statement of
Senator James A. Reed, D-Mo.) (relating an anecdote of a publisher with a multimillion dollar building who would rather
give it to posterity than sell with 80 percent of the profits going
to the government).
27
1936 House Hearings, supra note 22, at 607 (statement of
Herman Oliphant, General Counsel, Treasury Department).
28
2 Treas. Dep’t, Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth, General Explanation of the Treasury Department
Proposals 128-29 (November 1984).
29
George K. Yin and David J. Shakow, American Law Institute Federal Income Tax Project: Taxation of Private Business
Enterprises Reporters’ Study 138-39 (1999).
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in Congress too had railed against the inside tax shelter.30 By the 1980s, however, small business enjoyed
bipartisan support, most strikingly in a 92-0 Senate roll
call vote in 1981 increasing the inside corporate rate
preference.31 Thus, tax politics easily trumped tax
policy in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which, instead of
repealing the inside graduated corporate rates as Treasury proposed, actually doubled the base for the inside
corporate rate of 15 percent from $25,000 to $50,000.

Tax politics easily trumped tax policy
in TRA ’86, which, instead of repealing
the inside graduated corporate rates
as Treasury proposed, actually
doubled the base for the inside
corporate rate of 15 percent.
CRS and commentators conclude that all of the rationales for granting graduated rates to small business
corporations (other than the difficulty of raising out-

30
1936 House Hearings, supra note 22 at 341 (statement of
Rep. Samuel B. Hill, D-Wash.) (emphasizing that the undistributed profits tax would “put all the money earned in
enterprise through the tax mill on a comparable basis”); id. at
139, 343, 470-71, 799-800 (statements of Chair Robert L.
Doughton, D-N.C.) (pointing out the importance of the undistributed profits tax to eliminate the preferential tax treatment of corporations). On a personal note, I went to high
school with a grandson of Bob Doughton, who was still well
remembered with great pride in Alleghany County. My
grandfather worked on the Blue Ridge Parkway which
Doughton brought to North Carolina and Virginia in the 1930s.
The reader is encouraged to look at the passage at footnote
374 of my Texas article for an outstanding example of Rep.
Doughton’s populist criticism of the inside corporate tax shelter.
31
127 Cong. Rec. 16,252-54 (1981); see id. at 16,247 (statement
of Senator Edward Kennedy, D-Mass.) (small business has
been “the greatest source of innovation, the greatest source
of jobs, the greatest source of research and development, and
the greatest source of productivity in our society”); id. at
16,252 (statement of Senator Lowell Weicker Jr., R-Conn.)
(same); id. (statement of Senator Sam Nunn, D-Ga.) (small
business accounts for nearly half of gross national product,
87 percent of new employment, and nearly half of major
industrial innovations); see also 131 Cong. Rec. 8,375 (1985)
(statement of Rep. Charles B. Rangel, D-N.Y.). All of these
claims ignore that the number of private C corporations enjoying the preferential inside graduated rates constitute a
small percentage of all small businesses. See 142 Cong. Rec. H
9,859 (daily ed. August 2, 1996) (remarks of Rep. Bill Martini,
R-N.J.) (referring to mom-and-pop sole proprietors as “true
small businesses”); 127 Cong. Rec. 16,247 (1981) (remarks of
Sen. Dave Durenberger, R-Minn.) (small C corporations were
far outnumbered by small, small businesses — the sole
proprietors — who were in greater need. “The concern here
is for who gets what benefits we can provide and how much
help we are going to provide, and how much equity we are
going to do for those who really need it in this country.”).
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side capital) are myths or rhetoric.32 Probably the determinative factor beyond the mystique of small business,
however, is that small business people that tend to be
local “opinion leaders” who influence local voting patterns and make political contributions.33 These are the
people that members of Congress (from both parties)
talk to about taxes in their visits home.34

D. Dry C Corp. Paying Out All Profits
Historically a private C corporation paying out all
of its business income either as compensation or deductible fringe benefits has been used to obtain
deductions for certain fringe benefits, including
premiums paid for health and accident insurance
and group-term life insurance, paid on behalf of its
shareholder-employees and received tax free by such
shareholder-employees, then deducted by the corporation.35 Currently, lesser amounts of health and accident
insurance premiums paid by an LLC on behalf of a
member-employee or an S corporation on behalf of a
2-percent-or-more shareholder-employee are deductible.36 These tax rules may explain in part the very large
percentage of active C corporations breaking even —
reporting neither income nor loss. The phase-in from
1997 through 2003, or most likely sooner, of a full
deduction for health insurance costs of self-employed

32
Tax Expenditures Compendium, supra no te 14, at 255
(evidence mixed); David L. Brumbaugh, CRS, Federal Taxation
of Small Business (Apr. 14, 1994), Doc 94-5069, 94 TNT 102-47;
see also Gravelle, supra note 11; Marc Levinson and John M.
Barry, “Small Business: Myth and Reality; the Number of New
Firms Is Up Sharply, But the Role of Small Business as the
Economy’s Cutting Edge Is Greatly Exaggerated; Includes Related Article on Political Influence of Small Business,” Dun’s
Business Month p. 30 (Sept. 1985); Ronald F. Wilson, “Federal
Tax Policy: The Political Influence of American Small Business,” 37 S. Tex. L. Rev. 15, 29, 64 (1996); Robert J. Samuelson,
“The Great Pretender,” Washington Post A-19 (Aug. 11, 1993).
33
Dennis Chong, “Values Versus Interests in the Explanation of Social Conflict,” 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2079, 2108-09 (1996);
B. Garland, “Small Business Rocks the Vote,” Bus. Week 14
(June 3, 1996); Bradley A. Smith, “Money Talks: Speech, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance,” 86 Geo. L. J. 45, 91
(1997) (noting that for small business owners, money contributions are the “primary source of political participation
beyond voting.”); Wilson, supra note 32 at 32-50 (discussing
the influence of political contributions by small businesses).
34
See, e.g., 1978 House Hearings, supra note 20 (Part 2), at
1253-54 (statement of Representative Ed Jenkins, D-Ga. (sympathizing with the tax and regulatory burdens faced by small
business owners), (Part 5) at 2802-03 (statement of Rep. Ed
Jenkins) (explaining that small business owners in his district “showed great interest in the issue . . . of capital gains”
taxation)).
35
IRC sections 79, 106, 162(a); see Susan Kalinka, “Limited
Liability Companies: Assignment of an Interest in a Limited
Liability Company and the Assignment of Income,” 64 U. Cin.
L. Rev. 443, 470-71 n.157 (1996); Richard A. Booth, “Limited
Liability Companies: Profit-Seeking, Individual Liability, and
the Idea of the Firm,” 73 Washington U. L.Q. 539, 547 (1995)
(possibility of deducting health insurance payments made at
the firm level is one of the attractions of the C corporation).
36
See IRC section 162(l) (60 percent is deductible for 1999,
70 percent in 2002, and 100 percent in 2003, and thereafter).
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individuals — thus ending the horizontally preferential treatment of private C corporation employeeshareholders, may be expected to reduce the allure of
private C corporations used to pay out all profits as
(deductible) compensation and fringe benefits. Such a
result would be consistent with the SOI projections for
an annual 1.2 percent decline for 1999-2005 in the number of smallest income (mostly private) corporation
returns, Form 1120-A (filed by C corporations with
gross receipts, total income, and assets each not in
excess of $500,000).37 This asset category shows disproportionate losses and a very small share of corporate income.38

III. S Corporation: Most Popular New Entity
A. Fastest Growing Small Business Tax Entity
LLCs clearly are not supplanting S corporations. The
growth rate of S corporations exceeds the growth rate
for all partnerships and applies to a larger base. The
number of S corporations increased around 10 percent
from 1,901,505 in 1993 to 2,153,119 in 1995 and
2,304,416 in 1996.39 For 1997 1,755,000 partnership
returns were filed as contrasted with 2,450,000 S corporation returns.40 SOI projects that for 1999-2005
partnership and S corportaion returns will increase at
annual average rates of 4.04 and 4.16 percent, respectively.41 SOI estimates that S corportaion filings will
first exceed C corporation filings in 2000, and projects
that S corporations will be the fastest growing type of
business tax entity from 1999 through 2005. 42 S corporations are accounting for an increasing percentage of
total corporate-sector income, from 11 percent in 1993
to 17.6 percent for 1996.43
SOI data shows that for 1995, 10.8 percent of S corporation net income was reported by the “finance, insurance, and real estate” industrial group,44 which
reported 61.9 percent of the net rental net income of S

37
Frank Zaffino, “Projections of Returns to Be Filed in
Calendar Years 1999-2005,” 18 SOI Bulletin 178, 184 Table 1,
179 fig. A. (No. 3 1999).
38
For example, for 1993, Forms 1120-A with net income
reported $971,130,000 total net income; $28,496,000 was
reported by C corporations with zero assets; $609,994,000 by
C corporations with assets under $100,000; $227,187,000 by C
corporations with assets exceeding $100,000 and under
$250,000; and $105,453,000 by C corporations with assets
more than $250,000 and under $500,000. 1993 Statistics of Corporate Income, supra note 6 at 245 line 67. This was 1.7 percent
of C corporation income ($971,130,000 ÷ 571,922,088,000 = 1.7
percent). Id. lines 66-69.
39
See 1995 Stat. of Income Division, Internal Revenue Serv.,
Stat. of Income: Corp. Income Tax Returns 9, 481 (Pub. 1053
revised March 1998); and 1993 Statistics of Corporate Income,
supra note 1, at 481; Susan Wittman and Robert Grant, “S
Corporation Returns, 1996,” 17 SOI Bulletin 41 (No. 4 1999).
40
See Zaffino, supra note 37, at 184 tbl. 1.
41
Id. at 179 fig. A.
42
Id.
43
Wittman and Grant, “S Corporation Returns, 1996,” supra
note 39.
44
Susan Wittman, “S Corporation Returns, 1995,” 17 SOI
Bulletin 43, 49 Figure E (No. 4 1998).
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corporations.45 Finance, insurance, and real estate
returns made up 10.5 percent of all S corporation
returns.46 Th e significantly greater percentage of
partnerships versus S corporations in this industrial
group, as discussed below, is consistent with the bias
in the S corporation tax rules against including entitylevel debt in a shareholder’s basis, which is a key element of partnership passthrough of real estate losses. 47

B. Life Cycle of Private Corporations
Before the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the tax literature
and hearings presented a paradigm tax life cycle of a
private corporation, beginning with an S election
during the in itial loss first stage; an d once the
profitable second stage was reached, the S election was
then terminated and the organization operated as a C
corporation (S to C conversion) to accumulate earnings
taxed at lower graduated inside corporate rates.48 Historically the third and last stage, C to S conversion,
occurred when a private C corportaion approached
unreasonable compensation or accumulated earnings
problems, or perhaps unexpectedly began to incur
losses that would benefit the owner-entrepreneur if
passed through.49
Consistent with the first stage of initial passthrough
of operating losses, newly formed S corporations
reported an average loss of $5,921 for 1987, while established S corporations reported average income of
$20,262, and newly converted S corporations reported
average income of $71,986.50 Of the 1,901,505 active S
corporation returns filed for 1993, 1,015,324 reported
net income.51 Thus, 53.4 percent reported no income or
incurred a loss.

In contrast, and consistent with the third stage, 68.1
percent of C to S conversions for 1987 reported positive
income (almost 2⁄3 of the remaining 31.9 percent C to S
conversions reporting a loss in 1986 also reported a loss
in 1987).52 This indicates that perhaps a third of C to S
conversions are made to pass through otherwise
operating losses trapped in a C corporation. This is
likely a problem of substantial magnitude since 61 percent of C corporations for 1993 reported no income or
incurred losses.53
In recent years between one-quarter and one-third
of new S elections have been made by private C corporations, i.e., C to S conversions, with almost a third of
those conversions apparently being made by loss C
corporations. Of the more than 268,000 returns filed by
new S corporations for 1996, 71.6 percent were filed by
newly incorporated businesses and 28.4 percent were
filed by C to S conversions;54 of nearly 270,000 returns
filed by new S corporations for 1995, 70.7 percent were
filed by newly incorporated businesses, the rest by C
to S conversions;55 of 250,000 returns filed by new S
corporations for 1994, 41 percent were filed by newly
incorporated businesses, the rest by C to S conversions;56 of 255,600 returns filed by new S corporations
for 1993, 75 percent were filed by newly incorporated
businesses, the rest by C to S conversions;57 and of
241,600 returns filed by new S corporations for 1992,
2⁄3 were filed by newly incorporated businesses, the rest
by C to S conversions.58 In the last four of these years
the number of new S elections each year exceeded by
125,000 to 150,000 the total annual increase in S corporation returns,59 probably reflecting the substantial

45

Id. at 47.
Id. at 44 fig. A (reporting that finance, insurance, and real
estate made up 326,149 out of 2,153,119 S corporation returns
in 1995).
47
Joint Committee on Taxation Staff, Present Law and Proposals Relating to Subchapter S Corporations Home Office Deductions 2 (JCS-16-95 May 24, 1995), Doc 95-5239 (44 pages), 95
TNT 102-23. See Melvin N. Greenberg, “Forms of Organization for Holding and Developing Real Estate,” 29 N.Y.U. Inst.
on Fed. Tax’n 1129, 1134, 1148 (1971) (the fact that losses are
passed-through to each partner is a reason to organize real
estate ventures as partnerships).
48
See, e.g., Lee, “Entity Classification,” supra note 18, at 91
n.130 and authorities collected therein; Allen Fishman
Column, “Fit the Form of Your Business to Your Special Circumstances,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch 22 (Nov. 19, 1990) (“The
most common forms of business are sole proprietorships,
partnerships (limited or general), regular C-corporations, and
S-corporations. These forms may be used in combination or
a different form may be used at various stages of a business.”).
49
See Lee, “Entity Classification,” supra note 18, at 91 n.130.
50
Susan M. Wittman and Amy Gill, “S Corporation Elections After the Tax Reform Act of 1986,” 17 SOI Bulletin 82-83
(No. 4 1998).
51
1993 Statistics of Corporate Income, supra note 6, at 497.
46
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52

Id.
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
54
Wittman and Grant, supra note 39, at 40.
55
Wittman, supra note 44 at 43.
56
Susan M. Wittman, “S Corporation Returns, 1994,” 16 SOI
Bulletin 38, 38 (No. 4 1997).
57
Amy M. Gill and Susan M. Wittman, “S Corporation
Returns, 1993,” 15 SOI Bulletin 27, 28 (No. 4 1996).
58
Amy M. Gill, “S Corporation Returns, 1992,” 14 SOI Bulletin 73, 74 (No. 4 1995). The highest rate of C to S conversion
during these years occurred in 1994 after the outside rates
had been retroactively raised at the highest individual brackets for 1993, and thus the pain of a return reflecting such
increases arose on about April 15, 1994. IRC section 6072
(setting the due date for calendar year individual income
return at the 15th day of April following the close of the
calendar year).
59
For 1993, increase from the prior year of total S corporation returns was 116,134; for 1994, the increase was 122,249;
for 1995, the increase was 129,365; and for 1996, the increase
was 151,297. Gill and Wittman, “S Corporation Returns,
1993,” supra note 57, at 29; Wittman, “S Corporation Returns,
1994,” supra note 56, at 39; Wittman, “S Corporation Returns,
1995,” supra note 44, at 44; Wittman and Grant, supra note 39,
at 41.
53
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failure rate in small businesses 60 and perhaps some
second stage S to C conversions.

C. Reasons for S Corporations Flourishing
The story of the S corporation’s continued flourishing contrary to conventional wisdom apparently rests
on (1) over 50 percent of S corporations in general (and
probably much higher in newly formed S corporations)
having only one shareholder61 so that the S corporation
capital, ownership, and income allocation restrictions
are academic; (2) substantial inertia, leaning to the
familiar and usually cheaper (as to formation costs) S
corporation, motivating both tax advisors and their
small-business clients;62 and (3) many, virtually all in

60
The literature indicates a 50 to 75 percent failure rate
during the first five years. See, e.g., Gary D. Burton, “Incubators as a Small Business Support in Russia: Contrast of
University-Related U.S. Incubators With the Zelenograd Scientific and Technology Park,” J. of Small Bus. Management 91, 92
(Jan. 1998); (citing U.S. Small Business Administration Office
of Advocacy 1992 for the proposition that “the failure rate for
a small business is typically between 55 and 65 percent during
the first four to six years of existence); Phillip F. Zeiderman,
”Franchising: Who Needs It? The Role of Small and Medium
Sized Companies,” Franchising, Winter 1984, at 11; Ellen P.
Aprill, “Caution: Enterprise Zones,” 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1341,
1357 (1993). Many of these business start up again under the
same ownership. See G. Richard Shell, “Substituting Ethical
Standards for Common Law Rules in Commercial Cases: An
Emerging Statutory Trend,” 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1198, 1238 (1988).
61
JCT, S Corporations, supra note 47 (“S corporations continue to be predominately held by three or fewer shareholders. In 1993, half of all S corporations [had] one shareholder; these firms [held] 31 percent of all S corporation
assets. Fewer than one-sixth of S corporations [had] more
than three shareholders. More than 90 percent of S corporation assets are in firms with 10 or fewer shareholders.”). This
same pattern continued for 1995 and 1996. See Wittman, “S
Corporation Returns, 1995,” supra note 44 at 45 (in 1995, 52
percent of S corporations had one shareholder; 30 percent,
two shareholders; 7.6 percent, three shareholders; and 7.6
percent, four to 10 shareholders); Wittman and Grant, supra
note 39, at 43 (showing that in 1996, 53.3 percent of S corporations had one shareholder; 29.9 percent, two shareholders;
7.7 percent, three shareholders; and 8.3 percent, four to 10
shareholders); s e e a ls o Symposium, “Check-the-Box and
Beyond: the Future of Limited Liability Entities,” 52 Bus. Law.
605, 623 (1997) (Professor George Yin observes that partnerships follow a similar pattern with 50 percent having only
two partners; 75 percent, four or fewer partners; and 90 percent, 10 partners or fewer).
62
Symposium, supra note 61, at 624-5, 629-30 (Professor
Carol R. Goforth; Ira Meislik, Esq.; Professor Larry Ribstein;
Jude Lemke, corporate counsel; Dale G. Schedler, Esq.; and
Irving Schloss, Esq.); accord, Franklin A. Gevurtz, Business
Planning (2d ed. 1995), 1998 Supp. 19-20. Professor Coven
similarly believes that practitioners accustomed to the private
C corporation form may prefer S corporations to LLCs for
passthrough treatment of private businesses for at least the
near-term future. Symposium, supra at 630; accord, Douglas
E. Starcher, “Limited Liability Company May Be Good Incorporation Alternative,” Orlando Sentinel, March 24, 1997, at 32;
Symposium, supra at 625, 631 (Lemke, Meislik, and Schedler)
(weighing the additional costs of new forms and “tailormade” language). See generally Phillip J. Baptiste and Tracy J.

(Footnote 62 continued in next column.)
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my anecdotal experience, tax advisors believing that
an S corporation can be used to reduce wage taxes in
a services business by splitting profits between a
“reasonable” salary subject to such taxes and S corporation “dividends” not so subject.63
Section 482 cases dealing with sole proprietor service businesses that incorporate (as a C corporation)
suggest that the Service can determine under section
482 that the arm’s length compensation charged by the
S corporation shareholder for her services (where capital is not a material income-producing factor) is essentially equivalent to what she would have received abs e n t i n c o rp o r a t i on b e c a u s e t h a t i s w h a t a n
uncontrolled taxpayer could demand and obtain.64 In
such circumstances under the majority approach the
Service can reallocate income from the S corporation
to the shareholder as an arm’s length charge (compen-

Monroe, “Negative Aspects to Using LLCs for Operating Companies,” 27 Tax Adviser 472 (1996) (listing familiarity, drafting,
and return preparation expense factors as reasons to avoid
LLCs); Cheryl A. Cruz and John E. Karayan, “Should Your
Firm Operate as a LLC?,” 21 (California State University, Los
Angeles) Business Forum 16 (June 22, 1996) (learning curve
problems). This factor may cut toward choice of an LLC at least
by attorneys drafting the documents who may be able to
charge far more for an LLC than for an S or C corporation.
Symposium, supra at 626-627 (William R. Asbell, Esq.; Michael
Bamberger, Esq.).
63
See Raby and Raby, supra note 13 (scheming to avoid
payroll taxes through S corporation dividends). See generally
Phillip J. Baptise and Tracy J. Monroe, supra note 62 (discussing familiarity, drafting and return preparation expense factors); Kirsten Harrington, “Employment Taxes: What Can the
Small Businessman Do?” 10 Akron Tax J. 61, 70-5 (1993);
Mi chael P. Watters and D aryl Bu rckel, “Establi shing
Reasonableness of Compensation Difficult in IRS Attacks,” 8
Akron Tax J. 147, 150 (1991) (calculating that taxpayers have
won only 20 percent of inadequate compensation cases in
contrast to 50 percent of excessive compensation cases).
64
See Keller v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1014, 1025-26 (1981),
aff’d 723 F.2d 58 (10th Cir. 1983). The court there commented
that:
Assuming that Keller, Inc.’s share of partnership profits
from MAL and its fees from MAL, Inc. continued to be
on a par with those payments in the pre-incorporation
years, one would expect petitioner, in an arm’s-length
transaction with an unrelated party, to have bargained
for a total compensation package which would approximate the amounts he previously received as a sole
proprietor. One would similarly expect that petitioner’s
total compensation would also reflect any increase in
MAL and MAL, Inc.’s earnings over and above the preincorporation years. To the extent of any meaningful
disparity between these amounts, it is our view that the
Commissioner is correspondingly justified in making
an adjustment in petitioner’s income to properly reflect
the true taxable income he earned in his capacity as
Keller, Inc.’s employee.

(Footnote 64 continued on next page.)
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sation) for her services.65 Such reallocation would affect FICA wage taxes.66 Section 482 might not apply to
undercompensation for wage tax purposes under the
rationales that it is limited to clearly reflecting income
for income tax purposes or is predicated on the shareholder-employee not working exclusively for the service corporation. If so, the theory that the section 482
deemed arm’s length charge for services is the substantial equivalent to what the shareholder-employee
would have received as a sole proprietor (including
subsequent increases in profits) should be extended to

The Commissioner lost in Keller because the professional
services corporation paid all of its earnings out as compensation or contributions to a qualified retirement plan. Id. at 102829. Congress’s unhappiness with the “result” in Keller lead to
section 269A. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 97-760, at 634 (1982)
(Congress intended that this provision would “overturn the
results reached in cases like Keller v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1014
(1982), where the corporation served no meaningful business
purpose other than to secure tax benefits which would not
otherwise be available.”). That provision is limited to reallocations between a personal service corporation and shareholderemployee where the corporation performs substantially all of
its services for one other entity. See Mary LaFrance, “The Separate Tax Status of Loan-Out Corporations,” 48 Vand. L. Rev.
879, 904, 919 (1995) (describing the government strategy to
oppose service industry tax avoidance). Keller supports the
practice of C corporations (particularly professional corporations) paying out all profits as compensation and fringe benefits (especially health insurance). See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
65
Cases conflict over whether the shareholder and the corporation are two commonly controlled businesses for purposes of section 482 under which the Service may reallocate
income between two or more businesses owned or controlled
by the same interests if necessary to clearly reflect income.
See Fogelsong v. Commissioner, 691 F.2d 848, 851 (7th Cir. 1982)
(“[Section 482] . . . should not apply, however, to one who
does work exclusively for his corporation”) (emphasis
omitted), rev’ing 77 T.C. 1102 (1981). The Service properly
refuses to follow this holding. Rev. Rul. 88-38, 1988-1 C.B. 246;
Ronald H. Jensen, “Schneer v. Commissioner: Continuing Confusion Over the Assignment of Income Doctrine and Personal
Service Income,” 1 Fla. Tax Rev. 623, 667-68 (1993) (section 482
is unimpaired by Fogelsong because the common law assignment of income doctrine achieves the same result); see generally Elliott Manning, “The Service Corporation—Who Is Taxable on Its Income: Reconciling Assignment of Income
Principles, Section 482, and Section 351,” 37 U. Miami L. Rev.
657, 678-79 (1983) (harmonizing section 482 with Fogelsong
and illustrating the failures in the court’s reasoning). The
Fogelsong review court overlooked that being an employee of
a corporation itself constitutes a trade or business. Primuth v.
Commissioner, 54 T.C. 374, 378 (1970) (“[I]t is possible for an
employee to retain, at least temporarily, his status of carrying
out his own trade or business, independent of receiving any
compensation from a particular employer.”).
66
See Foster v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 34, 236 n.146 (1983).
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fix what is reasonable compensation for wage tax purposes.67 The sensible answer of course is contained in
President Clinton’s stillborn health bill: treat 2-percentor more S corporation shareholders as partners for
SECA purposes.68

IV. LLCs as Entity of Choice for Some Firms
A. Where LLCs Prevail
The number of partnerships of all types increased
around 6 percent from 1,493,963 in 1993 to 1,580,900 in
1995.69 The number of partnerships further increased
to 1,654,256 for 1996 and to 1,755,000 for 1997, with SOI
projecting an average 4.04 percent annual increase for
1999-2005.70 This recent pattern of growth in numbers
of partnerships is largely attributable to LLCs, which
grew from 17,335 in 1993 to 47,816 in 1994, and then

67
Compare Treas. reg. section 1.482-1(b) (“A controlled transaction meets the arm’s length standard if the results of the
transaction are consistent with the results that would have
been realized if uncontrolled taxpayers had engaged in the
same transaction under the same circumstances . . .”) with id.
section 1.162-7(b)(3) (“[S]uch amount as would ordinarily be
paid for like services by like enterprises under like circumstances.”). The “arm’s length” standard under the section 482
regulations is “equally applicable in ascertaining the ‘ordinary
and necessary’ character of a payment to a related entity” that
is deducted under section 162(a). R.T. French Co. v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 836, 849 (1973). The Tax Court in Bianchi v.
Commissioner, 66 T.C. 324, 332 (1976), ruled that “. . . it is proper
to make reference to prior self-employment earnings to decide
whether current corporate compensation of an employee is
reasonable.” The new S corporation made a “deferred compensation payment” covering a seven-day period far out of line
with prior self-employment earnings to support a qualified
plan contribution and create a passthrough loss, both of which
the court disallowed as attributable to unreasonably high compensation. Id. at 333.
68
House Subcomm. on Health of the Comm. on Ways and Means,
103d Cong., Report on H.R. 3600, Health Sec. Act of 1993, H.R.
Doc. No. 103-25, at 302 n. 34 (Comm. Print 1994) (“Subcomm.
Report on Health Security“) (explaining the provision ”(1)
amend[ing] the definition of NESE to include the pro rata
share of certain S corporation income of certain shareholders
and (2) modify[ing] the rules applicable to limited partners
in a partnership, for SECA tax and health insurance premium
purposes.”); “NYSBA Advocates Uniform Self-Employment
Tax Treatment for Owners of Interests in Pass through Entities,” Doc 94-10926 (22 pages), 94 TNT 245-43 (citing New
York State Bar Association, Memorandum, “Uniform Self-Employment Tax Treatment of Owners of Interests in PassThrough Entities,” Dec. 9, 1994, which advocates elimination
of the distinctions between types of partnerships for SECA
calculations); see also Thomas E. Fritz, “Flowthrough Entities
and the Self-Employment Tax: Is It Time for a Uniform Standard?” 17 Va. Tax Rev. 811, 856 (1998) (“the most noteworthy
aspect of the various proposals introduced in the 103rd Congress is the fact that each measure would have extended
application of the self-employment tax to 2 percent shareholders of an S corporation”).
69
See Timothy D. Wheeler, “Partnership Returns, 1995,” 17
SOI Bulletin 43 (No. 2 1997).
70
See Alan Zempel, “Partnership Returns, 1996,” 18 SOI
Bulletin 45 (No. 2 1998); Zaffino, supra note 37 at 184 Table 1,
179 fig. A (providing data as to 1997 returns).
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from 118,559 in 1995 to 221,498 in 1996.71 Indeed, in
1996, in contrast to the just over 100,000 increase in
LLCs there was a 50,000 decline in the number of general partnerships and only a 16,000 increase in the number of limited partnerships.72 Partnerships have gone
from reporting a net loss (reflecting the shelter years) to
reporting substantial positive income — $106.8 billion.73
Significantly, in 1996, more than 70 percent of the
LLCs were concentrated in “finance, insurance, and
real estate” and services — around 50 and 20 percent,
respectively.74 Real estate businesses constituted almost 80 percent of the “finance, insurance, and real
estate” SOI category and the industry group as a whole
made up over 53.9 percent of all partnerships in 1996. 75
Note that 80 percent of the income of services partnerships was attributable to the professions of law, health,
and accounting according to SOI data.76 Such real estate and services market segments dominate all

71

See Timothy D. Wheeler, “Partnership Returns, 1994,” 16
SOI Bulletin 76, 82 (No. 2 1996); Wheeler, supra note 69, at 52;
Zempel, supra note 70, at 56.
72
See Zempel, supra note 70, at 50 fig. F (noting that the
number of LLCs grew from 118,559 to 221,498, the number of
general partnerships declined from 1,167,036 to 1,116,054, and
the number of limited partnerships increased from 295,304 to
311,563).
73
Amy Hamilton, “Partnership Profits in 1995 Largest in
History, IRS Data Show,” Tax Notes, Jan. 12, 1998, p. 148 (increase in partnership profits to $106.8 billion for 1995 compared with 1994 was the largest in history, continuing trend
of large percentage increases in overall net income first observed in 1991).
74
See Zempel, supra note 70, at 48; Wheeler, “Partnership
Returns, 1995,” supra note 69, at 45 (in 1995, 2⁄3 of LLCs were
found in these three areas). A June 1999 study of registration
records for 1,252 LLCs in 43 states found a large portion were
professional service firms. In the sample 26 percent consisted
of engineering and management support companies; 19 percent, real estate businesses; 12 percent, construction; and 9
percent, investment companies. In a similar sample of 680
limited liability partnerships, 29.7 percent consisted of law
firms; 28.5 percent, medical firms; 12.1 percent, accounting
firms; and 9.7 percent, real estate services. Conrad S. Ciccotello and C. Terry Grant, “LLCs and LLPs: Organizing to Deliver
Professional Services,” Business Horizons (Mar. 1, 1999).
75
See Zempel, supra note 70, at 50, fig. F (allowing the
reader to calculate this figure by dividing the total number
of business in these three categories by the number of those
business which were real estate businesses). Using 1990 SOI
data, the General Accounting Office reported that real estate
accounts for 44 percent of “partnerships”; financial and insurance, 7 percent; services, 18 percent; retail trade, 10 percent; and agriculture, 8 percent. General Accounting Office,
Tax Administration: IRS’ Partnership Compliance Activities Could
Be Improved, Table I.2 (GAO/GGD-95-151 June 16, 1995), Doc
95-6038 (36 pages), 95 TNT 118-21. See also “California Franchise Tax Board Report on Calculation of the Adjustment to
the Limited Liability Company Fees for 1999,” Doc 1999-5719
(31 original pages), 1999 STT 31-5 (more than 30 percent of
LLCs are in the real estate industry, 27 percent are in the
service industry, 6 percent in manufacturing, and the rest are
in other industries).
76
See Zempel, supra note 70, at 46 fig. B.
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partnerships in roughly the same percentages as in
LLCs.77 In short, the growth in LLCs as to market segments as of 1995-96 followed exactly the same pattern as
all partnerships generally and thus probably tended to
take more from other forms of partnerships — or what
would have been other partnerships — than from C or S
corporations.78 LLCs thus do not appear to be the wave
of the future supplanting both C and S corporations.
To the extent that LLCs do partially supplant private
C corporations from 1999 through 2005, it may be for
the wrong reason: the myth of double taxation. This is
not a bad result, since all private firms (a more administrable surrogate for separation of ownership from
management) should be taxed the same as passthrough
entities, i.e., at individual rates.79 Similarly, while con77
See Wheeler, “Partnership Returns, 1994,” supra note 71,
at 76, 78 fig. D (reporting that for 1993, finance, insurance, and
real estate accounted for 54.2 percent of all partnerships, while
services accounted for 17.5 percent and together they accounted for almost 75 percent of both net income and deficits
of all partnerships). Eighty-four percent of the income of services partnerships was attributable to the professions of law,
health and accounting. Id.; Wheeler, “Partnership Returns,
1995,” supra note 69, at 44 fig. B (reporting essentially the same
patterns for 1994); Zempel, supra note 70, at 46, 46 fig. B
(reporting essentially the same pattern for 1995).
78
See Barbara C. Spudis, “LLCs and LLPs: Take the ‘L’
Train,” 1 53rd N.Y.U. Inst. on Fed. Tax. 9-1.1 (1995); Stanley M.
Chervin, “The Impact of LLCs on Tennessee Revenues,” Doc
1999-5923 (6 original pages), 1999 STT 30-37 (1998 survey with
70 percent response rate reveals that (a) the 22 percent of
LLCs with previously existing business form consisted of C
corporations, 5.7 percent; S co rpo rati ons, 8.7 p ercent;
proprietorship, 40.3 percent; and partnership (general and
limited), 35.8 percent; and (b) if LLC form were unavailable,
firms would have chosen C corporation, 5.3 percent; S corporation, 24.1 percent; propietorship, 4.9 percent; and partnership, 42.1 percent).
79
Yin and Shakow, supra note 29 at 109-110, 145-146 (advocate mandatory pass through as to private corporations); see
George K. Yin, “ALI Reporters Study on Taxation of Private
Business Enterprises,” Doc 1999-31991 (4 original pages), 1999
TNT 191-68 (providing an overview of the Reporter’s study);
see also Lee, “Entity Classification,” supra note 18 at 88-93,
119 (passthrough treatment should apply “whenever the
owners of the entity have control over the process of earning
the entity’s income or control the use and disposition of such
earnings”; Surrogate, “rough justice” tests based on size or
number of owners [or a private/public trading line] are more
administrable); MLP Hearings, supra note 19 at 340-42, 348
(Statement of Professor Lee) (advocating dual track approach
to integration of private and public corporations); Lee, “Capital
Gains Proposals,” supra note 24 at 1418 (proposing mandatory
passthrough of income or loss as to private C corporations and
mark-to-market accrual taxation of shareholders of public C
corporations); see also Joseph M. Dodge, “A Combined Markto-Market and Pass-Through Corporate-Shareholder Integration Proposal,” 50 Tax L. Rev. 265 (1995) (detailed proposal
along same lines); Anthony P. Polito, “Dual-Approach Tax Integration: Issues for Discussion,” Tax Notes, Dec. 9, 1996, p.
1213. Some economic thought similarly believes that limited
liability should be afforded only where ownership and
management are separated. Henry Manne, “Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics,” 53 Va. L. Rev. 259, 284
(1967). See generally Lawrence E. Mitchell, “Close Corporations
Reconsidered,” 63 Tulane L. Rev. 1143 (1989).
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trary to conventional wisdom, LLCs are not supplanting S corporations due to restrictions on capital and
allocations (since largely irrelevant to the single-owner
entity), to the extent that LLCs are chosen more by
professionals and real estate businesses and S corporations are chosen more by other service businesses and
retail businesses, taxpayers are lurching toward rational self-selection along complex/simple business lines
— not a bad result either. A thesis of Professors Yin and
Shakow’s Taxation of Private Business Enterprises is that
the full complexities of aggregate subchapter K are too
much for small business practitioners and businesses
to handle.80

B. Flexibility of LLCs for the Tax Sophisticated
One of the most significant choice of tax entity
differences between subchapters S and K is that an S
corporation cannot make inside basis adjustments to
its assets on the death of a shareholder or a transfer of
her interest, as a partnership can.81 The one-class-ofstock limitation, coupled with the requirement that all
items of income or loss be allocated “pro rata” among
outstanding shares of stock determined on a daily
basis, preclude for S corporations the partnership
flexibility of allocating items of income or loss to different investors and especially allocation of losses disproportionally to, for example, a capital partner followed by a later charge back of income.82 Furthermore,

S corporation liabilities are not included in a shareholder’s basis in her stock interest, which serves as a
ceiling on current deductibility of passed-through S
corporation losses.83 In contrast, partners can take
deductions supported by partnership liabilities.84
Shareholder loans to an S corporation support a loss
deduction for that shareholder only, unlike the partnership rules under which such debt (except nonrecourse
debt) is “shared” by all partners like any other debt for
basis purposes.85 These differing liability sharing rules
play a significant role in an entity’s choice between
subchapter S and subchapter K as the best vehicle for
holding depreciable real estate.86 There are other,
usually less significant, differences between taxation of
S corporations and their shareholders and taxation of
partners. For example, there are differences in (1)
receipt by service partners of a profits share; (2) transfers of property to the entity when liabilities exceed the
transferor’s basis; (3) varying ownership interest rules;
(4) non-partner/employee capacity transactions with
the entity; (5) retirement payments to former principals; and (6) debt-equity lore where appreciated
property is transferred to lock in character of gain,
among others.87

83

80

Yin and Shakow, supra note 29 at 125-130.
IRC sections 743, 754 ; Martin J. McMahon Jr., “Optional
Partnership Inside Basis Adjustments,” 52 Tax Law. 35, 35
(1998).
82
Compare IRC sections 1366(a) (1) and 1377(a) (1) with
Treas. reg. sections 1.704-1(b)-(c); see also JCT, S Corporations,
supra note 47; Gevurtz, supra note 62 at 80-82, 166-69; William
J. Rands, “Passthrough Entities and Their Unprincipled
Differences Under Federal Tax Law,” 49 SMU L. Rev. 15, 18-19
(1995).
81
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See IRC section 1366(d)(1); id. section 1367 (listing items
included in shareholder basis, and omitting liabilities of an S
corporation from the list).
84
JCT, S Corporations, supra note 47.
85
See id.; IRC sections 752(a) and 722; Karen C. Burke, “The
Uncertain Future of Limited Liability Companies,” 12 Am. J.
Tax Pol’y 13, 19-20 (1995); Rands, supra note 82, at 19-20. For
a description of the arcane and somewhat counterintuitive
rules pertaining to shareholder guarantees of S corporation
debt and shareholder basis, see Susan Kalinka, “Shareholder
Guarantees and Subchapter S Basis: Investment in the Corporation,” 63 Temple L. Rev. 659 (1991).
86
See Patrick J. Mullaney and Richard D. Blau, “An Analytic
Comparison of Partnerships and S Corps as Vehicles for
Leveraged Investments,” 59 J. Tax’n 142, 143-44 (1983) (differing liability sharing rules may make the use of a partnership
advantageous where the entity assumes a liability, and discussing means by which S corporations can avoid such disparate results); Jerald D. August and Mark L. Silow, “S Corporation vs. Partnership for Real Estate Ventures,” 1 J. of Tax’n
of Investments 91, 119-20 (1984); Eugene Chester and William
H. Whitledge, “Partnership or Subchapter S Corporation:
Which Provides the Greater Tax Benefits?” 10 Tax’n for Law.
176 (1981). Cf. Warren Paul Kean, Comment: “After the
Facelift, Is Subchapter S Any More Attractive?” 46 La. L. Rev.
87, 123 (1985) (noting that Congress is “disinclin[ed] to extend
the liberal basis adjustment rules available for partnerships
when such provisions have induced the creation of many
perceived abusive tax shelters”).
87
John Lee, “Partnership Profits Share for Services: an Aggregate Exegesis of Revenue Procedure 93-27” (Part 1), Tax
Notes, Mar. 28, 1994, p. 1733; James Edward Maule, ”Report
on the Comparison of S Corporations and Partnerships” (pt.
2), 44 Tax Law. 813, 858-59 (1991); Alan R. Sumutka, “Selecting
a Form of Business,” 67 CPA J. 24, 24 (April 1997); Rands, supra
note 82, at 20 n. 29.
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Appendix I. C versus K/S Passthrough Checklist
A. Inside Tax Shelter in Small C Operation (At a Profit)
1. Inside Shelter:
a. Graduated inside rate on taxable income
a. (section 11)

15 percent on first $50,000
25 percent on next $25,000
34 percent on excess of $75,000
39 percent on excess of $100,000 until
$11,750 is “clawed back”
35 percent on excess of $10,000,000

b.
b.
b.
b.

15 percent up to $36,900
28 percent up to $89,150
31 percent up to $140,000
36 percent up to $250,000
39.6 percent above $250,000

Graduated outside rate
(joint return regular rates) on
taxable income
(section 1(a))

c. Tax savings inside may be compounded by investment in high-dividend-yielding stocks or taxc. exempts. (If so, corporate AMT and possibly PHC or accumulated earnings tax problems may then
c. arise.)
d. A (Dis]“Qualified personal service corporation” (doctors, lawyers, and such, but not cowboys) is
d. taxed at a flat 35 percent on retained earnings. Section 11(B)(2).
2. Outside Shareholder Taxation on “Distribution/Realization”: Zero if die with it, minimal if sufficiently
2. deferred.
a. If shareholder holds stock until death, outside tax on appreciation — retained earnings is eliminated
a. with date-of-death step up. Section 1014
b.
b.
b.
b.
b.

Outside individual capital gains tax rate usually is 20 percent of gain; but if stock is “Qualified small
business stock” (active C corporation not engaged in services, financing, farming, mining, or
hospitality businesses) held for five years the maximum individual capital gains rate is 14 percent
(subject to AMT rules). Section 1202. If sufficiently deferred but stock sold prior to death, the
discounted present value of this outside tax may be de minimis.

c.
c.
c.
c.

It (and the inside anti-General Utilities tax) may be viewed as equivalent to “deficit
restoration/minimum gain change back” in a subchapter K tax shelter. You don’t have to believe it’s
real, until you sell it. And if you defer it long enough it does not really matter. But when you actually
pay it, it hurts.

3. General Utilities Repeal: 34 percent inside if sell tomorrow, but will tomorrow ever come?
Now sections 311, 336, and 338 mean that on a “distribution” (in redemption, dividend, or liquidation)
of appreciated property, the “distributing corporation is taxed inside” on such gain while the
shareholder is taxed outside on the net gain.
As with outside tax, if sale of business is sufficiently deferred, present value may be de minimis. I
understand that before the 1993 changes, most sales of such business were structured as taxable “asset”
sales by the target corporation followed by, an outside shareholder capital gain on liquidation under
section 331 by shareholder. Now often stock is sold for capital gains and purchaser of stock does not
elect section 338.
4. Hidden Transactional Costs
a. Laundry list of private C — inside accumulation problems.
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
vii.

denial of inside deduction for unreasonable compensation. Section 162.
re-allocation to clearly reflect income. Sections 446, 482.
accumulated earnings tax. Section 531.
PHC tax. Section 541.
constructive dividends at shareholder level. Section 301.
bail-out: redemption-termination of interest, liquidation-reincorporation. Sections 302, 361.
collapsible corporation provisions. Section 341.

b. Reality: “audit lottery” and pig theory.
5. Payroll Taxes
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B. Passthrough of Losses
1. Operational Losses
a. Formative Stage.
Traditional wisdom is that passthrough entity is ideal for flow-through of initial operating losses for
immediate use by owner against outside income.
i. Entity(s) vs. “aggregate” (K) approach to “sharing”; inside liabilities for outside basis favors K over S.
b. At initial profitability, use of private C (by conversion of S or incorporation of K) was once common.
2. Tax Shelter Losses.
a. Laundry list of tax shelter loss restrictions leading up to PAL (section 469), e.g., section 1245/1250
a. recapture; minimum tax, at-risk (section 465), profit-motive, section 183, etc.
b. Passthroughs pass PAL losses out to owners with same characteristics.
c. Closely held C (no size limit), other than “services organization,” can use passive losses to shelter
c. operating income, but not portfolio income.
i.

Query. Is this a solution for a C with accumulations in excess of reasonable business needs as
to current earnings?
ii. Closely held service corporations are subject to PAL.
C. Metamorphosis: From Separate Tax Entity to Passthrough Entity
1. Separate Tax Entity to Passthrough Entity
a. Introduction. The setting for C to S or K is when the inside shelter runs out (retained income $100,000
per year or $250,000, etc.) and retained earnings “ceiling” for accumulated earnings approaches.
b. C to K.
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.

Outside: Shareholders section 331
Inside: Full recognition (section 336, etc.) on appreciation.
Advantages of step-up; no S shareholder or corporation restrictions; elimination of “C
Doppelgänger.”
Disadvantage of outside tax and inside tax makes such “dis-incorporation” too costly.

c. C to S Conversion.
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.

v.

Outside. Nonrecognition event as to shareholders
Inside: (1) nonrecognition of tax benefits, assignment of income, recapture, etc. LIFO reserves
are picked up now. Watch out for possible future legislation here.
Timing of S election and short C/S Years.
S with “C-Doppelgänger” (E&P)
(1) Ten-year taint of C to S as to built-in gain, worse than C to S. Section 1374
(2) C E&P
(a) Distributions in excess of AAA. Section 1368(c).
(b) Passive income tax, section 1375, and continuance for three consecutive years results
in termination. Section 1363(d)(3).
Qualified Retirement Plan shareholder-loan prohibited transaction problems.

d. S to K (S to LLC Conversion).
Under current law for full conversion, the S corporation would have to be liquidated with resulting
taxation under section 336 that would passthrough to shareholders increasing their bases under section 1367(a)(1) and thus decreasing their liquidation gain at shareholder level under section 331 or
even creating a capital loss generating a mismatch in the case of S corporation-level gain attributable
to deemed liquidating sale of inventory or other ordinary income assets. Treasury once mentioned taxfree conversion from S to LLC for a limited time. There is precedent in a little-used transition rule for
tax-free liquidation of professional service corporations in the aftermath of the merger of the corporate and self-employed retirement plan rules in 1982.
2. Passthrough Entity to Separate Tax Entity
a. Introduction. Traditionally once the formative state of losses was passed, the inside shelter of a small
a. C becomes the next stage of metamorphosis.
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b. K to C: section 351 incorporation
i.

Outside. If section 351 is met (“control,” etc.), “partner” — now shareholder has substituted
basis, nonrecognition (except for section 351(b) “boot”) subject to varying degrees to the following:
(1) assignment of income
(2) tax benefit
(3) liabilities in excess of basis
(4) depreciation “recapture” recognized but only to extent of “boot”
C-Transferee
(1) carryover basis

ii.
c. S to C
i.
ii.

iii.
iv.

Outside. Nonrecognition event
(1) Post-Termination Transition Period. Section 1366(d)(3). Grace period for withdrawals of
AAA and contributions to increase stock basis for “suspended losses.” Section 1371(e).
Inside.
(1) Short S and C years. Section 1362(e)(6).
(2) No carryover inside of losses, etc.
(3) Apparently no recapture, tax benefit, assignment of income, etc.
Timing of “termination” and mechanics
S corporation status reelection. Section 1362(g).

Appendix II. Passthrough Tax Entities: K or S Checklist
A. Code Framework
Function

K

S

1. Passthrough

Section 702. Conflict over entityaggregate

Sections 1366(a) and (b), different
conflict over entity-aggregate

2. Account for Income

Section 703, entity

Section 1363, entity

3. Allocations

Section 704; Section 704(b) implicitly follows entity; should be
“aggregate” under “assignment of
income” principles

Section 1377(a), pro rata share,
strict entity (but what about debt
and salary to shareholder
employees)

4. Varying interests

Section 706, aggregate, especially
for service partner and retro

Section 1377(a), strict entity

5. Nonpartner transactions

Section 707, line drawing on
partner, aggregate and nonpartner
(entity) transactions
according to partner-like
characteristics of transfer/
performance and risks as to fact
and amount payment

No corresponding provisions

6. Contributions

Sections 721, 704(c), 724, 737, and
752 (in transfers of encumbered
property) mandate “aggregate”
approach

Sections 351, 357 follow an entity
approach with mostly nonrecognition due to “mere change in form”

7. Distributions

Sections 731, 732, 751(b),
aggregate (substituted basis) with
entity for disproportionate
(section 751(b))

Section 1368, entity with conduit
feature of withdrawal of undistributed profits but “CDoppelgänger” if C E&P.
Also inside-entity tax on property
distributions. Section 1362(d)
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Appendix II. Passthrough Tax Entities: K or S Checklist (Continued)
Function
8. Sales transfers of interest

K
Sections 741, 743, 751(a), and 754.
Surface entity, with mandatory
partial aggregate (section 751(a))
for potential “ordinary income”
inside and optional aggregate
inside basis adjustments (section
754 and 743)

S
Pure entity. No inside adjustments. Section 341 may apply
outside.

B. Passthrough Entities: K or S
Major Transactional Differences K and S
1. Sharing of entity liabilities

“Aggregate” under section 752
turns on recourse-non-recourse,
limited-general. Should, but
probably won’t, turn on who will
carry burden of partnership principal amortization

Entity, too limited, especially in
operating business context. And
PAL should take care of shelter
losses.

2. Distributions

Aggregate. No gain inside,
substituted basis outside as to
property distributed; carryover up
to outside basis, with outside
ceiling as to nonliquidating;
constructive cash distributions
and section 751(b) necessary to
handle flip-flop abuse

Full recognition taint gain inside.
Outside, nonliquidating nonrecognition up to outside basis, but FMV
basis for property with limited
conduit aspects; liquidating,
recognition outside and inside.
Full entity approach.

3. Allocations

a. Maximum flexibility (by entity
approach; section 1.704(b) regs
permit abuse).

On surface, pure entity with strict
proportionate sharing of income
and loss.

b. Sections 707(a)(2) and 707(c)
permit entity approaches that were
functionally equivalent.

Flexibility in year-end bonus, etc.
to shareholder-employees and
interest on shareholder “debt” as
yet uncharted.

c. mandatory aggregate approach
as to built-in gain/loss/character
of contributed property
d. Retroactive allocations for
relative “contributions” to profits
and not due to varying capital
contributions-infusions during
year.
4. Acquisition of Interest

Mistaken entity approach followed in Diamond and by most
commentators. Sections 707(a)(2),
704(c), and 724 allow appropriate
timing and character. Rev. Proc.
93-27, 1993-24 C.B. 343, Doc 936562, 93 TNT 123-7

S requires entity approach and
“current” taxation as to interest
received for services. Sections
351(d), 83

5. Inherited interest

Stepped (up) inside basis if
section 754 election.

No stepped up inside basis, but if
IRD, outside basis reduced. Section 1367(b)(4).
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Appendix III. Data Derived From International Association of Corporation Administrators,
Annual Report of the Jurisdictions 1997-1999 (LEXIS® -NEXIS® and LEXIS® Document Services Compiler)
Domestic and Foreign
For-Profit Corporations
State

1995

1996

1997

Domestic and Foreign
LLCs
1998

1995

1996

1997

1998

Alabama

8,611

9,976

10,176

9,344

1,800

2,548

3,430

4,624

Alaska

1,752

1,718

1,767

N/A

163

335

534

N/A

Arizona

13,978

15,402

15,362

14,237

5,189

6,601

8,199

10,267

Arkansas

N/A

8,445

8,344

7,925

N/A

1,420

1,717

2,047

California

48,309

51,841

55,757

57,815

8,373

12,151

17,979

23,190

Colorado

18,371

20,213

18,778

17,398

6,562

8,094

9,184

11,307

Connecticut

*8,770

8,747

8,600

5,225

*7,095

9,730

12,296

13,456

Delaware

48,168

51,600

53,030

48,885

6,933

10,888

20,731

30,793

N/A

2,813

3,158

N/A

N/A

1,245

1,245

N/A

Florida

103,746

110,827

115,835

114,796

1,399

1,892

2,357

5,124

Georgia

30,147

30,683

33,425

32,143

2,417

4,374

6,693

9,239

Hawaii

N/A

4,592

4,092

3,651

N/A

N/A

768

1,454

Idaho

3,830

3,886

3,954

3,883

1,107

1,449

1,899

2,323

Illinois

38,051

40,003

39,949

39,420

2,646

3,654

4,940

7,271

Indiana

14,089

14,247

15,928

15,224

2,465

3,152

4,022

5,115

6,082

6,569

6,913

5,891

1,325

1,641

2,189

2,507

*6,305

7,985

9,791

N/A

*1,658

1,867

2,397

N/A

Kentucky

9,438

10,809

10,810

9,870

1,505

2,190

2,647

3,955

Louisiana

13,122

13,804

13,766

11,845

2,872

3,908

5,750

7,554

Maine

3,780

4,018

4,039

3,869

293

434

708

1,054

Maryland

N/A

22,624

22,287

21,737

N/A

4,092

5,950

6,884

16,378

15,872

16,012

15,251

N/A

2,193

3,363

4,973

N/A

28,670

28,213

25,449

8,868

7,955

11,053

17,589

13,943

14,620

14,803

14,607

1,403

1,987

2,549

3,844

1

1,188

1,876

1,463

District of Columbia

Iowa
Kansas

Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri

6,460

7,065

7,589

6,814

859

12,188

13,100

14,821

17,163

2,991

4,078

6,887

7,043

2

523

N/A

1,498

Montana

8,798

3,417

4,475

4,616

Nebraska

4,412

4,630

4,915

N/A

610

742

1,113

N/A

20,790

N/A

N/A

N/A

1,956

N/A

N/A

N/A

4,199

4,451

4,249

3,807

660

861

1,495

2,525

3

8,442

10,700

13,609

Nevada
New Hampshire

500

New Jersey

42,221

38,261

36,710

34,732

New Mexico

*4,568

*4,527

*4,353

N/A

*1,148

*1,485

*1,881

N/A

New York

77,533

79,725

80,529

78,912

8,431

11,170

14,454

18,101

*19,427

21,354

22,823

22,131

*3,267

4,494

6,001

8,162

2,254

2,273

2,508

2,253

269

304

370

477

24,057

23,831

23,897

N/A

4,653

6,790

8,733

N/A

9,332

9,972

10,140

N/A

2,356

2,904

3,721

N/A

North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
TAX NOTES, April 17, 2000

6,374

433

COMMENTARY / SPECIAL REPORT

Appendix III. Data Derived From International Association of Corporation Administrators,
Annual Report of the Jurisdictions 1997-1999 (LEXIS® -NEXIS® and LEXIS® Document Services Compiler)
(Continued)
Domestic and Foreign
For-Profit Corporations
State

Domestic and Foreign
LLCs

1995

1996

1997

1998

1995

1996

1997

1998

Oregon

*N/A

*N/A

*N/A

*N/A

*N/A

*N/A

*N/A

*N/A

Pennsylvania

22,896

23,366

24,705

22,869

491

723

1,498

3,519

Rhode Island

3,690

3,626

3,626

3,472

510

785

1,018

1,448

South Carolina

9,977

10,592

15,485

16,149

1,270

2,143

3,645

4,826

South Dakota

2,414

2,670

2,600

2,685

399

478

550

600

Tennessee

10,546

10,798

10,139

9,203

3,340

4,855

6,456

7,702

Texas

45,024

44,191

45,656

47,026

5,446

6,628

8,664

11,935

Utah

N/A

8,046

8,710

8,497

N/A

6,067

6,574

7,191

Vermont

N/A

2,498

2,388

2,107

N/A

179

524

676

Virginia

23,035

22,712

23,063

22,555

4,215

5,398

8,206

9,974

Washington

17,235

16,467

15,852

16,192

2,889

4,243

6,279

9,134

N/A

N/A

4,350

5,700

N/A

N/A

400

660

Wisconsin

10,297

10,119

9,762

8,920

3,473

4,124

6,149

8,136

Wyoming

3,207

3,478

3,607

3,194

1,301

1,407

1,841

1,879

West Virginia

Each IACA Annual Report covers two years. Often the common year for two years’ reports contain conflicting data as to a particular jurisdiction. Furthermore, many of the jurisdictions responded to author’s
February 1998 written request for data as to new entity filings for 1995-97 and often provided data somewhat at variance with the corresponding IACA Annual Report of the Jurisdictions data. Nevertheless, I
believe that the above table accurately shows the trends of new reportings.
Where entry is followed by *, no data was contained in IACA Annual Report and data reported in my questionnaires were used instead. In case of *N/A, data was supplied in IACA Annual Report but inconsistencies
from IACA Annual Report to Annual Report and in the questionnaires were so great that the data was
treated as N/A or not available.
1
Includes LLCs, LPs, and LLPs.
2
Apparently combines LLCs and
3

Limited Partnerships.
Includes LLCs, LLPs, and Limited Partnerships.
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